Court records
- Format
- Set
- Court Records
- Text
- Searchable
Text as released
Machine-read from the scan. Names, dates and numbers can be misread — check anything you rely on against the original page.
Case 9:09-cv-80469-KAM Document 31 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/01/2009 Page 1 of 11
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO.: 09-CIV- 80469 - MARRA/JOHNSON
JANE DOE 11,
Plaintiff,
V.
JEFFREY EPSTEIN,
Defendant.
---------------'/
DEFENDANT EPSTEIN'S REPLY TO & MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF PLAINTIFF'S
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
Defendant, JEFFREY EPSTEIN, ("EPSTEIN"), by and through his undersigned
attorneys, replies to and moves to strike Point 4 of Plaintiff's Memorandum Of Law In
Opposition To Defendant Epstein's Motion To Dismiss, dated May 22, 2009, ("MOL").
Accordingly, Defendant states:
I. Legal Standard (pp. 1-2 of Plaintiff's MOL)
Plaintiff's reliance on Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957), as the Rule
12(b)(6) pleading standard is misplaced. As discussed in Defendant's motion to
dismiss, (pp. 16 - 17), the standard as detailed in Bell Atlantic Corp. V. Twombly, 127
S.Ct. 1955 (2007), is now the applicable standard, not Conley. Although the complaint
need not provide detailed factual allegations, the basis for relief in the complaint must
state "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do." Twombly, at 1965. Further, "[f]actual allegations must be
enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level ... on the assumption that all
the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)." Id. The United States
Supreme Court very recently made clear in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, No. 07-1015 (U.S. May 18,
Case 9:09-cv-80469-KAM Document 31 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/01/2009 Page 2 of 11
Jane Doe II v. Epstein, et al.
Page 2
2009)(slip copy op. at 20), that Twombly expounded the plead
[…]